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NURTURING THE PEACE:
SPANISH AND COMANCHE COOPERATION
IN THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

ELIZABETH A. H. JOHN"

IF EVER AN ALLIANCE tested the mettle of all parties,

it was that
of Spaniards and Comanches. It was a monument to Spanish statecraft on the northern frontier of New Spain: boldly recommended
in the 1760s by the Marques de Rubi to Carlos III, who had the
vision to adopt it; adroitly realized in New Mexico and Texas in the
1780s by governors Juan Bautista de Anza and Domingo Cabello;
tenaciously pursued by their successors through the final decades
of the viceroyalty. 1
But the delicate, often dangerous tasks of making the arrangement work fell largely to the people of the frontier, particularly
those of New Mexico: paisanos, Pueblos, and, increasingly over
time, genizaros. The complexity of the challenge that they faced,
the enormity of the odds, and the extent of their nearly forgotten
success, are dimensions of regional history worth pondering.
The formation of the alliance and its durability hinged upon
Comanche no less than Spanish vision and enterprise. ChiefEcueracapa and his fellows labored heroically to bring the far-flung Comanches to consensus for peace in the 1780s. Their successors'
constant challenge was to keep their followers convinced of its
usefulness. It was not enough that the principal chiefs agree that
their nation's interest lay in the Spanish connection. Since Comanche leaders had no power to coerce, their enforcement of treaty
commitments among their tribesmen rested solely upon their powers of persuasion. Against their arguments stood an honored tradition of horse theft and even more powerful imperatives of tribal
vengeance.
0028-6206/84/1000-0345
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Even worse for the prospects of the alliance, the Comanche
nation had never functioned as a single entity. At the turn of the
century it had two major divisions: Yamparicas, most of whom lived
in the western Comancherfa, and Cuchanecs, many of whom lived
in the eastern Comancherfa, bordering upon New Mexico and Texas
respectively. Each' was comprised of many bands, which were essentially clusters of family groups, and connections among them
were tenuous at best.
Fortunately, the difficulties were well understood by leaders on
both sides and were approached with realism and with good will.
Neither Spaniards nor Comanches ever imagined that a treaty could
eliminate the passions that spark clashes among persons. Their
purpose instead was to insure that offenses by those of one nation
against those of the other invoke law enforcement rather than war.
To achieve this goal, leaders pledged to report to each other such
offenses: each society would curb its wrongdoers and make restitution for their crimes. Spain, understanding that such new procedures would require time and experience, would forbear so long
as Comanche leaders strove faithfully to fulfill their commitments.
The alliance worked remarkably well from the beginning in New
Mexico, where interchange between settled villagers and roving
plainsfolk long antedated Spanish occupation. Western Comanches
readily fitted into the mutually advantageous patterns of trade and
friendship, as Hispanic settlers had done before them. Indeed,
Comanches would 'ultimately loom so large in the commerce of the
New Mexican frontier that traders to the roving peoples would be
dubbed "comancheros," although they were called in this earlier
time "los viageros."
Much less stable conditions confronted eastern Comanches on
the Texas frontier. There distances were so vast, population so
sparse, horses so numerous, and passage of Comanche war parties
after Lipan Apaches so frequent as to invite mischief. Through the
1790s eastern Comanche leaders struggled to curb horse thefts,
making restitution as fully as possible for crimes reported to them.
Years of patient practice lay ahead, however, if Comanches were
to match in Texas their reliability as allies and trading partners in
New Mexico. Meanwhile, there was the hazard that an untoward
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incident in Texas would spark a war that would inflame the Comancheria and undo the alliance in New Mexico. Western Comanche
leaders understood that risk and sometimes intervened to help their
eastern peers ward off catastrophe.
Despite all difficulties, the Comanche peace was an important
condition of life in Texas at the beginning of the n.ineteenth century,
just as it was in New Mexico. Tejanos traveled freely into the
Comancheria to hunt and to trade; Comanche families came routinely to trade and visit at San Antonio de Bexar. There eastern
Comanches received the crown's annual treaty presents, and some
Comanches formed personal friendships with San Antonians that
proved useful in troubled times.
In autumn of 1801 issues of tribal vengeance nearly destroyed
the peace in the eastern Comancheria. Unidentified Spaniards killed
two young stragglers from a Yamparica party bound for San Antonio,
one of whom was Chief Blanco's son, and three more Comanche
corpses turned up near Mission San Jose, possibly victims of Spaniards. When the bereaved chief and other kinsmell cried vengeance, Yamparicas of the upper Brazos and Red rivers sympathized.
Cuchanec leaders, however, rejected any tribal vendetta. Some
swore that if Chief Blanco should declare war, they would move
their much larger bands down the Brazos to fight beside the Spaniards. 2 When Cuchanec youngsters seized the excuse to raid in
Coahuila, their chief, Soxas, warned Spanish authorities, moved
his own camp to the Llano River to monitor developments on the
Texas-Comanche frontier, and volunteered to lead a delegation to
Chihuahua to counsel with the commandant general of the Provincias Internas. 3
Yet another grievance flared. Lipan Apaches killed twenty-five
ofChiefYzazat's followers, asleep nearthe Rio Grande, and rumor
h~d troops from Coahuila helping the Lipans. Yiazat, outraged,
sent spokesmen to San Antonio to confront Governor Juan Bautista
Elguezabal with the story. Confident that no troops had violated
the standing order against involvement in fights among Indians,
Elguezabal scrambled to squelch the rumor lest it spark Cuchanec
vengeance. 4
Meanwhile, Chief Blanco gave permission to kill Spaniards in
the same way that some had killed his son. As a result, in the spring
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of 1802 on the Blanco River, forty Yamparica warriors executed the
leader of a ten-man party of hunters from San Antonio. 5 That act
might have evened the score, but the fleeing huntsmen then met
a lone Comanche riding a horse with a San Antonio brand, rejected
his explanation that he had stolen it from' Apaches, and delivered
his scalp and rifle to the governor with the disputed horse.
Chiefs Soxas, Yzazat, and Socuina, then at San Antonio arranging
for their mission to Chihuahua, disavowed responsibility for the
execution of the hunter, on the grounds that those killings were
Chief Blanco's private revenge. They forbore comment on the Comanche's death, but anger blazed within the Comancheria. A faction hitherto wavering between peace and war turned hostile and
threatened to attack the camp where Soxas and Yzazat had left their
families. The chiefs rushed home, vowing that if they should find
nothing amiss, they would continue to Chief Chihuahua's camp to
coordinate measures against dissidents. They would keep the governor informed, and, if necessary, they would bring their families
to San Antonio for safety. 6
The issue of peace versus war raged in the eastern Comancheria
until mid-summer of 1802, when western Comanche leaders intervened. They opposed any eastern war against Texas and Coahuila, lest it cost all C6manches the benefits of peace with the
Spaniards. With such support, the peace faction won, and Texas
suffered no Indian problems that summer. Governor Elguezabal
learned the outcome from followers ofYzazat who stopped by San
Antonio on their way to punish Lipans. 7
The vengeance party unfortunately found no Lipans, and as they
turned homeward in September, some members consoled themselves with horses from Texas herds. Their young leader hurried
to San Antonio to explain, pleading that the nation not be blamed.
He speedily recovered and returned four of the stolen horses and
informed the eastern Comanche leaders. 8 A few weeks later in
autumn council when the chiefs were discussing treaty enforcement, Chief Chihuahua volunteered to form a police force to curb
wayward tribesmen. All agreed to spare no effort to identify and
punish Comanche offenders. The chiefs sent the governor that
news, promising to meet him at San Antonio the next spring. 9
Then Yzazat led 225 painted warriors southward to find Lipans.
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Near the Frio River they met a Spanish pack train. The muleteer
panicked and fled to San Antonio, crying that Comanches had
seized his animals and merchandise. Naturally, the warriors wanted
to grab the windfall, but their exasperated chiefs only let them
devour the sugar. Although rounding up animals and loading stuff
was women's work and onerous for warriors, within a week they
presented at San Antonio six horses and a mule packing nearly all
the goods. The muleteer confessed his lie, Governor Elguezabal
apologized to the chiefs for the accusation of theft, and both sides
parted cordially. 10
However, worse troubles brewed northward, where men from
the United States infiltrated villages whose intertribal connections
reached the Comancheria. Although most Americans came as traders, Commandant General Nemesio Salcedo suspected that their
real purpose was to undermine Spain's Indian alliances; and he
especially feared that they would seduce the Comanches. ll
Comanche leaders also worried about Anglo-Americans frequenting the Wichitan villages on Red River with inducements to steal
Spanish horses for the insatiable American market. Twice that winter Comanche chiefs warned Elguezabal of Taovayas and Wichitas
coming after horses. Even so, in February 1803, woodcutters from
San Antonio lost their animals to such raiders. After Spanish troops
overtook the culprits and killed nine, eight soldiers filed a complaint
that their commanding officer had acted excessively against the
thieves. 12 None doubted that Taovayas kinsmen would avenge their
nine dead or, even more alarmjng, that their nation might take up
their cause. Moreover, as old allies, Comanches would be pressed
to join any Taovayas vendetta. Recognizing the dangers implicit in
the situation, Elguezabal warned neighboring provinces that general Indian war hinged upon Comanche reaction. 13
Actually, Comanches did think killing nine men an excessive
response to the theft of a few horses, but their leaders upheld the
Spanish alliance. Indeed, they had fresh proof of its usefulness:
after Lipans had jumped a Comanche family departing San Antonio,
seventeen soldiers fended off the Lipans and escorted the grateful
Comanches back to sanctuary in San Antonio. The next week Chihuahua and Yzazat brought two hundred Comanches to council
with Governor Elgue~abal, and Chihuahua declared their desire

Women dressing robes and drying meat in a Comanche village, from Letters and Notes on the Manners, Customs, and Conditions of
the North American Indians by George Catlin, plate 164.
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for solid peace. 14 Naturally, they had been disgusted when Spaniards killed Chief Blanco's son, but the chiefs had done everything
possible to calm them, and they would not meddle in the Taovayas
affair. At the council Chihuahua presented thirty warriors picked
to police Comanche behavior and requested uniforms. To bolster
treaty compliance, the chiefs also wanted soldiers stationed in the
eastern Comancheria. For their part, the Comanches would respect
the detachment and gladly help build corrals and round up mustangs.
Since his warehouse was nearly bare, Elguezabal could only
promise to supply uniforms when the next gift shipment arrived.
The shipping delay also meant scanty presents at this council, but
the Comanches understood and accepted the governor's apology.
More disappointing for the Comanches was Elguezabal's lack of
authority to grant troops; he could only forward their request, and
to no avail. Commandant General Salcedo rejected the request on
the grounds that he was short of troops and had misgivings about
putting any soldiers at the mercy of the volatile Comancherfa. He
also feared that other tribes would clamor for troops if the Comanches were so favored. Since Salcedo could not supply troops
for every allied nation, the policy ofeven-handed treatment forbade
that soldiers b.e stationed with any nation. 15
Nevertheless, friendship between Comanches and Texans flourished in the summer of 1803. When 130 San Antonians rode west
for their May buffalo hunt, Comanches insisted that the hunters
accept their hospitality. As honored guests, the San Antonians were
fed and lodged throughout their hunt, and their horses were carefully tended by Comanche herders. Their hosts guided the Spaniards to herds where they took plenty of meat and tallow and finally
escorted them home late in June. 16
Meanwhile, countless Comanche families visited San Antonio,
and trade flourished at weekly fairs. By August, every important
chief in the eastern Comancherfa had come to pay his respects and
transact his business. Big war parties of Comanches and their allies
continued southward and eastward, pursuing their Lipan vendetta. 17
From San Antonio chiefs Chihuahua, Yzazat, and Sargento rode
on to Monclova, seeking a resident trader for their people. Such
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service had long been enjoyed by village Indians in Texas and was
much envied by Comanches who lived too far east to be served by
los viageros of New Mexico. Now the eastern Comanche leaders
urged that their need for trade be met within the Comancheria to
forestall the pernicious influence of American traders on the Louisiana frontier. Acting on their request, Coahuila's Governor Antonio Cordero helped obtain an experienced, literate trader. 18 The
experiment fizzled within a year, but briefly they knew the satisfaction and prestige of having their own trader. 19
An unhappy surprise greeted the chiefs on their return to San
Antonio: their younger associate, EI Sardo, and twenty-seven of
his followers were under arrest. The explanation was that Spanish
soldiers, pursuing Taovayas raiders, had passed EI Sordo's party
and noticed several horses from San Antonio. Worse, two men had
pieces of the musket of a settler whom Indians had killed. At first,
EI Sordo cooperated with the soldiers, but then he balked at turning over one of those men. Consequently, their leaders found them
all in Spanish custody, the two murder suspects manacled in the
jail, and the rest under guard in the Casas Reales. 20 Joining in the
interrogation, the chiefs discovered that the pair in jail had indeed
stolen those horses. The rest had resisted arrest of the thieves,
despite their chiefs' pledge to hand over all wrongdoers. While
Chihuahua attributed their lapse to his absence, he also scolded
the prisoners, vowing to punish anyone who should repeat such
crimes, even to kill them if necessary at the cost of his own life.
Furthermore, he declared that in the future he would oust from
the Comancheria anyone flouting his authority. In turn, Elguezabal
released to Chief Chihuahua all of the prisoners except the two
horse thieves, and the chiefs agreed that the guilty pair should
serve the jail term for theft. Two months later, Elguezabal released
both to their families. (Subsequent evidence showed that Taovayas
had committed the murder. )21
The episode seemed to leave no resentment, and 1804 became
a banner year for Comanches in Texas. They flocked to San Antonio,
trading, visiting, meeting Indian allies, mounting campaigns. That
summer Elguezabal's warehouse bulged, so he was able to compensate handsomely for the previous year's shortfall in treaty presents and also provide uniforms for Chief Chihuahua's thirty
policemen. 22
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Of all the treaty nations, only the Taovayas and Wichitas held
aloof that summer. Still torn over vengeance for their nine dead,
they were easy objects of mischief in this year of momentous change
i~ American impact among Indians ofTexas. The United States took
charge at Natchitoches in April 1804, four months after receiving
Louisiana from France with boundaries undefined. The unfortunate
Caddo peoples were left to wonder whether their homelands were
subje~t to American or Spanish dominion. Even worse for Spaniards
was the astonishing claim of the United States that Louisiana's
boundary was the Rio Grande.
No American was keener to grab Texas than Dr. John Sibley, a
physician-entrepreneur appointed United States Indian agent at
Natchitoches in December 1804. 23 By spring of 1805, Sibley had
on hand three thousand dollars' worth of presents with which to
woo Indians, regardless of international boundaries, and was promising them unlimited goods at cost from a planned government
trading house. 24 Thus Sibley sparked a decade of fierce competition:
Americans versus Spaniards, vying for Indians crucial to the peace,
prosperity, and ultimately the possession of New Spain's northern
borderlands.
To Sibley's enticements Comanches responded cautiously, despite the deep involvement of thei~ Taovayas and Wichita friends.
Eastern Comanche leaders sustained their commitments to the
Spanish crown, and they would have been astonished at Sibley's
official report that Comanches, although friendly to French or
American visitors, were "generally at war with the Spaniards after
committing depredations upon the inhabitants of Santa Fe and San
Antonio. "25
Comanche ties with San Antonio actually strengthened in 1805
when Governor Cordero was sent from Coahuila to Texas to relieve
dying Governor Elguezabal and to sharpen defenses against the
United States. 26 To welcome him, Chiefs Chihuahua, Yzazat, and
Sargento brought 353 Comanches to San Antonio for three days of
intensive talks, reaffirming with Cordero their treaty of alliance.
They assured him that no flag but the Spanish would fly over
Comanche camps, and that they would trust in that flag to overcome
the Osages, Pawnees, and other enemies whom they feared the
Americans were inciting against Comanches. They also promised
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not to deal with foreigners nor let them enter the Comancherfa
and to respect Spanish persons and property. 27
Cordero thought their four hundred horses-some of their own
raising, some captured wild stock-were superb animals. Some
bearing Spanish brands were cheerfully yielded for return to registered owners, with the chiefs agreeing to continue this practice.
They also promised· to accept punishment of any Comanche who
should injure Spaniards, but they urged the Spaniards to avoid
killing any offender, lest his relatives feel bound to avenge him.
Still, a crucial question remained: would Comanches rally to
defend Spanish territory if needed? A test loomed in February 1806,
when American troops forced Spanish detachments to fall back west
of the Sabine, prompting Governor Cordero to brace his command
for an attempt by the United States to push its boundary to the
Rio Grande. Given the clash of troops in the Caddo heartland,
movements of soldiers in Texas and Louisiana, and official harangues to Indian visitors at Nacogdoches and Natchitoches, news
of the confrontation spread swiftly among Indians throughout the
prospective theatre of war. Within a month, thirty-three loyal Comanche chiefs led two hundred warriors to San Antonio to offer
their services in gratitude to the crown. For six days they discussed
the current situation with Governor Cordero, promising to help
any Spanish troops operating near the Comancherfa. 28
Unfortunately, however, Comanche leaders had yet to resolve
their own problems. In April, wayward tribesmen seized horses
and mules from travelers on the Laredo Road, incidentally killing
one Spaniard. While troops from San Antonio recovered sixteen
animals, there was no sign of action by Chief Chihuahua's thirty
policemen. Chagrined at their unreliability, Governor Cordero dispatched Capt. Francisco Amangual as his spokesman to the Cuchanec leaders then encamped on the San Saba River. The message
was plain: the chiefs' duty was to pursue and punish Comanche
marauders, the ineffectiveness of their uniformed police was deplorable, and improved control was essential. To effect that improvement, the eastern Comanche leaders would have to elect one
of themselves to be responsible for all to the Spanish crown. 29
Western Cuchanecs and Yamparicas had long done so in New Mexico, where the alliance flourished, and Governor Cordero now
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required the same of eastern Comanches. They readily agreed, and
in Amangual's presence chose for their "big chief" the wise and
able Sargento. 30 To show his esteem for Governor Cordero and to
signify his own analogous importance in the Comancherfa, Sargento
took a new name: Cordero.
Chief Cordero acted promptly upon his new responsibilities,
visiting all camps of eastern Cuchanecs and neighboring Yamparicas. He also recovered and returned the last five of the stolen
mules, identified the source of the difficulties among followers of
Visinampa, and brought that chief to Governor Cordero. Of the
eastern Comanche chiefs, Visinampa was the only one who had not
yet paid his respects to Governor Cordero. Reputedly very loyal
to the Spaniards, he had long been ill and thus unable to ride to
San Antonio or to watch his people properly. While many disorders
had occurred, Visinampa assured the governor that he had now
regained control. The culprits had fled northwest to the farthest
Yamparica camps, but Visinampa had notified the principal chief
in that area. The intent was that the offenders be punished anywhere they could be found. 31 Governor Cordero accepted these
explanations and chiefs Cordero and Visinampa left, pledging to
help Spanish troops as needed.
Not only were Comanches poised to defend Texas against the
Americans, but other Indians were rallying to the cause as well.
Tonkawas assisted movements of troops and supplies to the eastern
frontier. Tawakonis helped prepare defenses from the Brazos to
the Red, and with Comanche help they persuaded most Wichitan
peoples to vacate the Red temporarily in order to keep clear of any
clash between Americans and Spaniards. Although Kichai and Caddo
villagers of eastern Texas accepted Dr. Sibley's presents, they too
retained primary allegiance to the Spanish crown. Caddo leaders
of Louisiana also cooperated cordially with Spanish as well as American authorities. In addition, Orcoquisas, Coushattas, Alabamas,
and Choctaws were pledged to help Spanish forces defend their
areas of residence on the lower Sabine and Trinity rivers, Karankawas faithfully reported coastal events, and Lipans remained peaceful
and cooperative in southern Texas. 32
Thus, in midsummer of 1806, Governor Cordero rode northeastward to meet the border crisis, reasonably confident that Texas
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Indians would help him repel the Americans. If only they could
submerge \heir tribal enmities in the common cause! A hopeful
precedent had occurred that spring on the New Mexican frontier,
where contending Kiowas and Comanches had made a permanent
peace. 33
Before leaving for Nacogdoches, Governor Cordero discussed
with some tribal leaders the desirability of settling their differences.
Apparently he was persuasive, for they made remarkable progress
in his absence. Whe~ five hundred Comanches, Lipans, and Tonkawas found themselves together at San Antonio in September,
their leaders consid~red the governor's advice and found it good.
They talked of makipg a treaty upon Governor Cordero's return,
and in the meantime their followers treated each other cordially. 34
Governor Cordero was back at year's end. The threat of war had
ended, abruptly, peacefully, when the Spanish and American commanders sensibly agreed to pull back their troops and respect a
neutral zone between the Sabine and the Arroyo Hondo until diplomats could draw the boundary. That arrangement boded ill for
the Caddo peoples whose heartland would be left as a lawless haven
for frontier rabble. But the immediate reaction among Indians was
relief at being spared a general war and admiration for the wisdom
of that Spanish-American accord.
When the nations went to San Antonio for treaty gifts in the
spring of 1807, the principal Comanche, Lipan, and Tawakoni leaders gathered in their own tents. Agreeing that their old feuds were
indeed harmful to their peoples' interests, they outlined peace
terms. Since they regarded the governor as their arbiter and the
axis of their relationships, they invited him to preside over their
final council. 35
On the day of the council, Indians of the three nations overflowed
the governor's house. Chiefs alone filled the parlor, with Chief
Cordero of the Comanches, Canoso and Morrongo of the Lipans,
and Daguariscara of the Tawakonis sitting next to Governor Cordero. Each of the principal chiefs spoke cogently against the evils
of war, displaying intellectual and moral insights that confirmed
Governor Cordero's conviction that these were not mere savages.
In fact, Daguariscara urged upon the council the example of the
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Spaniards who had recently settled their difficulties with the Americans peacefully rather than loose war upon the land. This Indian
treaty would borrow their concept of a buffer zone.
After their speeches, the chiefs asked Governor Cordero to mandate the mechanics of peace. He refrained, however, knowing that
no externally imposed solutions could dissolve age-old tribal enmities. Apart from expressing sympathetic interest, the governor
would only help them define the bounds where they should hunt
without bothering one another and without venturing into areas of
Spanish settlement. The Comanche boundary would be the Lomeria de San Saba (hills dividing the upper Colorado and Nueces
river systems). Any Comanche found without a passport between
the Rio Grande and Medina rivers would be brought to San Antonio
for interrogation. 36 This buffer zone would prevent clashes between
Comanche and Lipan hunters and curtail Comanche activity among
the settlements. All the chiefs pledged that their nations would
respect the boundaries and would treat each other as children of
one father, the king of Spain, regarding as enemies only those who
were his recognized enemies. Remarkably enough, the arrangement worked-at least for two years.
Yet another extraordinary example of intertribal cooperation occurred just five months later, when Comanches and Tawakonis
participated in a much broader council at Natchitoches. The occasion was inauspicious for President Thomas Jefferson's hope that
western tribes would welcome emigrant eastern Indians.
In 1807, while all the Anadarko men were away on spring hunt,
nine vagabond Choctaws destroyed their village on the Sabine
River, killing two Anadarko women and wounding another in the
process. That crime was the intolerable climax of a dozen years'
harassment of Caddo peoples by Choctaw intruders,37 but since
the culprits vanished back into the United States, Spanish authorities could do nothing. Clear duty lay with Dr. Sibley, who in 1804
had pressured Great Chief Dahahuit of the Caddohadachos to accept a treaty with the Choctaws, overriding Dahahuit's better judgment and the vehement objections of other Indians in the region. 38
When Sibley proved unable to deliver the Choctaw criminals, the
Anadarko chief called upon all indigenous tribes to march with him
to Natchitoches to demand justice and, if two Choctaws were not
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executed in their presence, to go to war against the Choctaws. 39
Predictably enough, eight other Caddo groups responded to the
Anadarko appeal, but the remarkable thing was that the Comanches
from the bands of Chihuahua and Visinampa rode to Natchitoches
together with Tawakonis and Kichais-all visiting American Natchitoches for the first time-to support the Caddo demand for treaty
performance by the Choctaws and the United States.
Rather than feeling alarmed by the visitation, Sibley rejoiced to
see eighty-odd Comanches with four chiefs. Lt. Zebulon Montgomery Pike, whom Spanish authorities had lately released on the
Natchitoches frontier, had explained to Sibley the special importance that the United States attached to Comanches. Since Pike
had failed to find any Comanches, their coming to Natchitoches
would commence official American contact with their nation. Sibley
singled out the Comanches for special hospitality and tried, unsuccessfully, to protect their horses from local thieves. While Sibley
had no interpreter of Comanche, he understood their leader to
prefer the American over the Spanish flag and grandly presented
him one. 40
The general council on 18 August yielded only guarded response
to Sibley's exhortation on peace and the joys of trade with Americans. The Comanches, Tawakonis, and Kichais indicated that they
would welcome traders and would perhaps visit Natchitoches again
if experience should prove Sibley's talk to be true. Dahahuit rose
to remind Sibley of his responsibility for the treaty of 1804 with
the Choctaws and demanded redress for the murdered Anadarkos.
Sibley explained his negotiations with Choctaw leaders and urged
the delegates to be patient. Although Dahahuit doubted the adequacy of either Choctaw or American efforts, he and his associates
grudgingly promised to postpone vengeance another three months.
Soon more Comanches came to investigate the possibilities of
the American marketplace. The four Yamparicas from upper Red
River who came that autumn had heard of the other Comanches'
visit, but they knew little of those southerly bands. These Yamparicas had ridden to Natchitoches with their Taovayas and Wichita
neighbors to secure guns for defense against the Osages, only to
find that few were available. The trip proved so onerous and the
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outcome so disappointing that they would not plan to come again,
although they would welcome American traders in their camps.
The ebullient Sibley never realized how discouraging was the
effect of these early Comanche experiences in Natchitoches. Of
course he knew that the theft of their horses and the scarcity of
guns upset them, but he did not comprehend how appalling they
found the prevalent drunkenness, or how niggardly his hospitality
seemed in comparison with Indian and Spanish practices. Probably
the doctor never learned how many Comanches contracted disease
at Natchitoches and died on the way home. 41 Chief Cordero, who
disapproved of the Americans, thought these disappointments
providential. While Governor Cordero fretted, the chief saw little
likelihood that the Americans of Natchitoches would make the Comanches forget that they were Spaniards.
Certainly no sign of disaffection appeared among Comanches in
the spring of 1808 when Captain Amangual led two hundred men
from San Antonio across the Comancheria to Santa Fe, visiting
every Comanche band along the way. Indeed, Comanche hunters
helped the expedition procure meat; Comanche guides took them
safely across the rugged, arid expanse to Pecos; and, finally, in
December, Chief Cordero furnished fresh horses to soldiers whose
mounts were too exhausted to continue home to San Antonio. 42
But even if Comanches considered themselves Spaniards, they
needed trade goods, and San Antonio let them down in 1808. The
shipment of gifts came late and included none of the small caliber
guns that Indians liked. In fact, wrong-sized guns shipped in 1806
already lay rusting in the warehouse because Indians would accept
no substitute. 43 No private vendor in San Antonio was able to supply
their needs, even though Comanches brought plenty of hides and
tallow to trade. These shortages in San Antonio virtually guaranteed
the success of the Natchitoches traders who ventured into the
Comancheria that fall. Dr. Sibley had not forgotten the promise of
his Comanche visitors to welcome American traders, nor had he
forgotten Yamparica hints of silver ore in their country. Therefore,
in the summer of 1808 he licensed Anthony Glas~ to lead ten men
up the Red River with merchandise to swap for horses and for ore
if he could find any. 44
After trading for two months at the Wichitan villages on Red
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River, Glass moved southward to the Colorado and Brazos. Hundreds of Comanches welcomed him, although a few who had visited
Natchitoches the year before took horses away from Glass to recoup
their losses at the American settlement. Some Comanches traded
with Glass on their way back from San Antonio, where Governor
Cordero had exhorted them not to do business with foreigners.
But these eastern Comanches saw no need to choose between
Spaniards and Americans; they were glad to be friends with both,
and they would trade wherever the goods and the prices were
right.
Could Comanches remain faithful Spanish allies and still get
plenty of horses for the American market? Perhaps, but Apache
herds would suffer. While eastern Comanches had forsworn raids
against Lipans in their San Antonio treaty of 1807, other Apaches
remained fair game. Indeed, in 1809, the governor of New Mexico
invited eastern Comanches to campaign against Mescalero Apache
raiders based in the Sacramento Mountains, promising them assistance and, more enticing, the right to keep all the horses they
could capture. 45
In response to the New Mexican invitation, Chief Cordero led
258 Cuchanec warriors against Mescaleros in the spring of 1810.
While he was away, the tenuous order within the ea~tern Comancherfa faltered. Lipans suffered most, but Comanches also stole
horses from Spaniards at San Marcos and Laredo. Although most
of the raiders were Yamparicas, spurred by ChiefVisinampa's deepening involvement with American traders, some were Cuchanecs;
most were easterners, but some came from the west. Casualties
on both sides raised the specter of general war.
Unable to contact the principal chief, Texas authorities informed
the governor of New Mexico, who in turn told Chief Cordero. 46
He rushed to San Antonio with forty warriors to meet the emergency and there found new, divided Spanish leadership. Antonio
Cordero had returned to his regular post as governor of Coahuila,
and the young, untried governor of Texas, Manuel Maria de Salcedo, was militarily subordinate to the very senior assistant commandant, Bernardo Bonavia. Fortunately, in this instance both proved
cooperative and sympathetic.
Chief Cordero proposed to convene all eastern Comanches, to
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recover and return all the booty he could find, and to turn in any
ringleaders whom he could apprehend. To back his effort he requested ninety Spanish troops, but Bonavia furnished 150. Moreover, Governor Salcedo uniformed Cordero's forty warriors to
underscore the official import of their mission. 4i
Chief Cordero soon accomplished his purpose. Most eastern Comanche leaders came to his council and cooperated in identifYing
marauders and recoverng stolen stock. Cordero also conferred with
western leaders, who meanwhile curbed their offenders and reaffirmed with the governor of New Mexico their loyalty to Spain.
Eastern and western leaders pledged to work henceforth as brothers to ensure treaty compliance, and to strengthen their connection, Cordero gave a daughter to the principal western Yamparica
chief, Oso Ballo. 48
Next, in October, the eastern Comanche leaders rode to San
Antonio to explain the breaches and to reaffirm their treaty. 49 They
promised not to strike the Lipans beyond the Lomeria de San Saba
and to avoid dealing with Americans. Furthermore, they would
apprehend Comanche marauders and return stolen property; the
nation would not avenge any member killed or injured while fleeing
the scene of a crime nor resist deportation of persistent offenders.
For the first time, the eastern Comanche leaders repudiated
certain individuals. EI Sordo had broken his Comanche ties that
year, moving down the Brazos to live near the Tawakonis, and a
few dissidents from Cordero's band had joined him. Since EI Sordo's camp had also become a rallying place for Taovayas, Tawakoni,
and Skidi Pawnee horse thieves, Comanche elders indicated that
they would not be sorry to see those incorrigibles killed.
However conciliatory the Comanche leadership, Governor Salcedo understood full well the limitations of this treaty. Chief Cordero and his peers had admitted that they could not control all
misguided youngsters, but such internal problems were hardly
unique to Indian societies. Salcedo also knew that New Spain had
yet to quell the rebellion that had erupted six weeks earlier at
Dolores, in the viceroyalty's heartland, with Father Miguel Hidalgo's cry for independence. Furthermore, Americans inciting
Indians to steal were largely beyond the control of the United
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States, even if it wished to curb their abuses. In such a world, who
could expect Comanche leaders to maintain perfect control?
In fact, the Comanche dilemma paled beside that of New Spain
in January when revolutionaries staged a bloodless coup at San
Antonio and shipped Governor Salcedo off in irons. Two months
later a royalist junta seized control. All across the northern provinces royalists and insurgents were actively seeking Indian help.
Royalists fared better because tribesmen were loyal to the king and
because many had personal friends among his officers. Consequently, in March of 1811, warriors from the southernmost Comancheria, as well as Lipans, helped royalists crush the insurgents
in Coahuila. 50
Meanwhile, Texas lay conspicuously vulnerable. Although muchdreaded Indian wars did not occur, horse thefts multiplied. Comanche and perhaps other Indian leaders tried in vain to reaffirm
their old friendship with the San Antonio junta, 51 but Texas had no
authority with whom they could deal until Lt. Col. Simon de Herrera came in July as acting governor. 52 Chiefs Cordero and Yzacha
promptly reported to him recent events within the Comancheria
and requested a formal council, to which Governor Herrera gladly
agreed. The extraordinarily encouraging aspect was that Oso Ballo
was coming from the western Comancheria to help his eastern
brothers bring their treaty compliance up to the high standard long
enjoyed in New Mexico.
The council that convened at San Antonio in mid-August reaffirmed the usual treaty terms. Then, after the eastern Comanche
leaders acknowledged their inability to enforce the terms uniformly, Oso Ballo proposed a new system of accountability, a mirror
of the system by which the Spaniards controlled their frontier
populace.
Under the proposed system, the chiefs, like Spanish commandants, would issue a form of passport to tribesmen who had valid
reason to travel into areas of Spanish settlement. Comanches crossing their boundary without such token should be treated as enemies
and disruptors of the peace, subject to deportation as incorrigible. 53
Since such a drastic proposal could only signify resolute commitment to their Spanish alliance, Spain had ample reason to appreciate Oso Ballo and his eastern confreres.
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Oso Ballo's good offices did not end there. He also apprehended
Taovayas and Comanches from EI Sordo's camp and made them
return to Governor Herrera horses they had stolen at San Antonio. 54
Subsequent events suggest also that Oso Ballo reasoned with EI
Sordo and perhaps moved him to reform. When horse thefts recurred in mid-autumn, Oso Ballo notified Governor Herrera that
the culprits were Tawakonis and Taovayas who planned a season
of raiding around San Antonio,55 and soon thereafter EI Sordo came
to report that Taovayas and Tawakonis had targeted Texas ranches
and that Taovayas had killed a muleteer.
Given EI Sordo's wicked reputation, Governor Herrera suspected the man's motives. But since EI Sardo had come unarmed,
with just one other man, two women, and a small child, and had
brought hides to trade, Herrera hugged him and provided the usual
hospitality at the government lodge. Unhappily, the next day a San
Antonian claimed a horse brought by EI Sardo. When Herrera sent
the interpreter with five soldiers to fetch EI Sordo, he reacted
badly, thinking they had come to kill him, and his party landed in
jail. Knowing that the incident could spark war, Herrera convened
military and civilian leaders to share the responsibility for decision.
The junta quickly concluded that EI Sordo's entire party constituted
a threat to the province, and the five were immediately shipped
in irons to the La Bahia jail, thence in March to a more secure
prison in Coahuila. 56
On 19 December 1811, just four days after the EI Sardo incident,
Manuel de Salcedo resumed the governorship of Texas and thus
fell heir to a surge of Comanche indignation. 57 When Oso Ballo
proclaimed that EI Sordo, having come unarmed, in good faith,
was wrongfully arrested and deported, his cry for vengeance stirred
many Comanches, Taovayas, and Tawakonis. However, the more
temperate Chief Cordero sent Visinampa to San Antonio to ask
about EI Sordo and would not go to war pending the governor's
response.
Worried Comanches warned friends at San Antonio that Oso
Ballo was gathering a great force on the Colorado to demand EI
Sordo and that to refuse would mean war. 58 EI Olloso rode to
Monclova to tell Governor Cordero of Oso Ballo's intent and declared that he and five other Cuchanec leaders would support the

364

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

59:4

1984

Spaniards ifwar erupted. Responding gratefully, Governor Cordero
told him to lead his warriors to Presidio Rio Grande to join troops
marching to San Antonio, then alerted Governor Salcedo to expect
Comanche volunteers. 59 But confrontation came before EI Olloso's
Comanches could join the troops. On 8 April 1812, Oso Ballo,
Cordero, Visinampa, and Yzacha appeared at San Antonio with
countless warriors. Governor Salcedo rode out to meet them with
675 men. 60 Once more the leaders talked; once more they preferred
their imperfect peace to the alternative of war. Still, confidence
between Comanches and Spaniards was not fully repaired. Memory
of EI Sordo's little group jailed in Coahuila would rankle for years,
fomenting ill will against Spanish authority in Texas and Coahuila
and eroding the power of chiefs faithful to the alliance.
A grim year lay ahead for Governor Salcedo and a discouraging
one for Comanches who cherished their Spanish alliance. In August
1812, Texas suffered the long-dreaded invasion from Louisiana, and
by April 1813, the oddly assorted Magee-Gutierrez band of American filibusters and Spanish insurrectionists destroyed the crown's
authority in Texas. During these chaotic circumstances, disaffected
Comanches, Tawakonis, and Taovayas seized the opportunity to
raid in Texas and Coahuila, but none of these Indians responded
to the invaders' urgent appeals for help in ousting the royalists.
Some Comanches supported the crown-in fact, two died in
November 1812 while helping Governor Salcedo against the Magee-Gutierrez force then entrenched at La Bahia. 61 Such faithful
friends as Chief Cordero must have deplored the insurrectionists'
slaughter of the captured Governor Salcedo and Commandant Herrera near San Antonio in April 1813. But Comanches did not rally
to the Spanish cause in the numbers that they would surely have
fielded in the time of Governor Cordero. Clearly, their summary
deportation of EI Sordo cost Salcedo and Herrera very heavily
indeed.
There is no record of Comanche involvement at San Antonio
while the insurrectionists held that capital from April to August
1813. Probably there was none, given the settlement's total disarray
under that occupation. Some two hundred Lipans did join the
insurrectionists, however, probably because their long-time friends
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the Menchacas espoused the cause. 62 If Comanches needed further
reason to hold aloof, the large Lipan presence would have sufficed.
When the royalists recaptured San Antonio in August 1813 and
drove back the invaders to Louisiana, some Tejano insurgents sought
refuge among Indians, often in Comanche camps. Over the next
seven years many Indian warriors would help those fugitives wage
a deliberate war of attrition, meant by the insurgents to make Texas
and Coahuila untenable for the Spanish crown. Still, as the war for
independence wore to a close, Spanish and Comanche leaders were
groping towards a new accord, and Mexico's new national government promptly pursued that aim. In fact, the Mexicans would
revive their colonial legacy: an imperfect peace, mutually useful
to Comanches and Spaniards, infinitely preferable to war, and never
comprehensible to the United States. Indeed, Anglo-American perceptions of Indians, radically different from those rooted in Hispanic tradition, would be acted upon so precipitously in the
succeeding era as to destroy even the memory of peaceful coexistence.
Why exhume this record now? For students of Comanche history
and of political anthropology it affords rare glimpses of the relationships between eastern and western Comanches, details of their
efforts to develop structures of authority, specifics of their migrations and their economy, and their intra- and intertribal relationships in an era of competing pressures from Spaniards and AngloAmericans.
Those primarily concerned with the history of the Hispanic Borderlands will recognize a freshly constructed segment of the obscure closing decades of the viceroyalty. Students of the westward
movement should find here a case study of worlds speedily destroyed in that relentless surge over "empty" lands. But the greater
contemporary value may lie in pondering the intricacies of communication and accommodation among radically unlike peoples
seeking mutual survival in a common arena. However greatly theatres and casts of characters change over time, human dilemmas
remain strikingly constant.
Lastly, there is a lesson for those who would separate the histories
of New Mexico and Texas. This analysis derives largely from the
archives of Spanish Texas, partly because many more documents
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survive in that venue, partly because Texas, as the arena of most
crises, generated more reports in this era. But the story of Comanche relations with Texas would be unintelligible without reference to the stable base of the alliance in New Mexico. Conversely,
the New Mexican experience cannot be properly understood apart
from the precarious situation eastward. The rich uniqueness of each
notwithstanding, the histories of New Mexico and Texas intertwine.
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